Dear Prisoners-Be Prepared to be Gawkedat: Other Prisoners Watching You StripNaked is Reasonably Related to PenologicalInterests, or is it? by Ryback, Kenzie
Penn State Law Review 
Volume 123 Issue 3 Article 9 
6-1-2019 
Dear Prisoners-Be Prepared to be Gawkedat: Other Prisoners 
Watching You StripNaked is Reasonably Related to 
PenologicalInterests, or is it? 
Kenzie Ryback 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/pslr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ryback, Kenzie (2019) "Dear Prisoners-Be Prepared to be Gawkedat: Other Prisoners Watching You 
StripNaked is Reasonably Related to PenologicalInterests, or is it?," Penn State Law Review: Vol. 123 : Iss. 
3 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/pslr/vol123/iss3/9 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Penn State Law Review by an authorized editor of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, 
please contact ram6023@psu.edu. 
  
 
839 
Dear Prisoners—Be Prepared to be Gawked 
at: Other Prisoners Watching You Strip 
Naked is Reasonably Related to Penological 
Interests, or is it? 
Kenzie Ryback* 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Fourth Amendment states that citizens have the constitutional 
right to privacy, which includes being free from unreasonable searches. 
When citizens become prisoners, however, their rights, including their 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches, may be limited. 
For example, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of blanket 
strip search policies in correctional institutions. The Supreme Court, 
however, cautioned that an unreasonably conducted strip search is 
unconstitutional if the strip search does not pass the reasonableness test. 
Because the Supreme Court has only reviewed cases involving privately 
conducted strip searches, the federal circuit and district courts have faced 
a new challenge: applying the reasonableness test to non-private, group 
strip searches. 
A strip search where a naked prisoner is forced to bend over and squat 
in front of not only the correctional officer conducting the strip search but 
also an audience of other naked prisoners is likely an extremely 
humiliating experience. Several courts agree that a wider audience 
enhances the invasion of privacy. What the courts have to determine 
regarding group strip searches is whether a legitimate penological interest 
of a correctional institution outweighs a prisoner’s privacy interests. 
This Comment will first examine the case law dealing with group 
strip searches. Next, this Comment will argue that courts rely too much on 
the correctional officers’ discretion when determining whether a group 
strip search advances a legitimate penological interest of the correctional 
institution. Finally, this Comment will analyze ways to combat the 
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deference and recommend that the Supreme Court formally adopt a “less 
invasive alternatives” test when courts balance the needs of the 
correctional institution against the privacy interests of the prisoners. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Approximately 2.3 million people are being held in 1,719 state 
prisons, 102 federal prisons, 901 juvenile correctional facilities, 3,163 
local jails, 80 Indian County jails, and other detention centers and prisons 
(collectively referred to as “correctional institutions”) across the United 
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States.1 Each year, correctional institutions facilitate roughly 11 million 
admissions.2 
Once a prisoner arrives at a correctional institution, a correctional 
officer (CO) then screens and interviews the prisoner for medical and 
security reasons.3 To combat potential security dangers correctional 
institutions subject prisoners to invasive strip searches4 as part of the initial 
screening, after visits with attorneys and family members, and after shifts 
at jobs or upon returning from a court hearing.5 Strip searches are 
necessary to maintain the correctional institution’s security and safety by 
discovering drugs, weapons, and other prohibited items that prisoners 
might smuggle into the correctional institution.6 
The Supreme Court held that correctional institutions are 
constitutionally permitted to conduct private strip searches if the strip 
search is reasonably conducted and related to a legitimate penological 
justification.7 Strip searches, however, are not always a private affair 
behind closed doors between the COs and the one prisoner being strip 
searched.8 What remains unclear is whether strip searching multiple 
prisoners at the same time, in full view of each other, or strip searching a 
prisoner in a public location is reasonable and related to a legitimate 
penological justification, and therefore constitutional.9 
 
 1. Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html.  
 2. Id. 
 3. See Inmates Custody and Care, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 
https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/entering_prison.jsp (last visited Jan. 31, 
2019). Correctional institutions are “unique place[s] fraught with serious security dangers.” 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
 4. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 330 (2012). Strip search 
is defined as “the removal of all clothing and the inspection of all folds of the skin and 
exterior parts of the body.” Strip Search, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2012). 
Depending on the jurisdiction, a strip search may include a visual body cavity search. See 
Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 561 n.3 (1st Cir. 1985). A visual body cavity search is 
the “visual inspection of the anal and genital areas.” Id. “Strip search” as used throughout 
this Comment will include a visual body cavity search.  
 5. See Body Cavity Searches at Michigan’s Women’s Huron Valley Correctional 
Facility, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://bit.ly/2G13WOE (last updated Apr. 12, 
2012). 
 6. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.  
 7. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 339; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.  
 8. See, e.g., Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2017); Lewis v. Sec’y of 
Pub. Safety & Corr., 870 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2017); Williams v. City of Cleveland (Williams 
III), 907 F.3d 924 (6th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. 
Dec. 7, 2018); Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2013); Lopez v. 
Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (E.D. Cal. 2009).   
 9. See Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1259 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Crump v. 
Passaic Cty., 147 F. Supp. 3d 249, 258 (D.N.J. 2015). 
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Group strip searches are particularly more invasive and humiliating 
than private strip searches,10 but until the case law develops, the extent of 
what penological interests are considered legitimate and reasonable to 
prompt the need to conduct a group strip search remains uncertain.11 Until 
the Supreme Court draws the line, prisoners are likely to face a legal 
system that favors the needs of COs and correctional institutions over 
prisoners’ privacy rights.12 
This Comment will address group and non-private strip searches and 
will seek to synthesize the arguments and rationale that the circuit and 
district courts rely on to determine whether a sufficient link exists between 
a correctional institution’s group strip search policy or practice and the 
needs of the correctional institution.13 Part II of this Comment will discuss 
the Supreme Court’s decisions related to the constitutionality of strip 
searches.14 Part II will also provide a discussion of the impact of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions concerning group and non-private strip 
searches on lower courts.15 Part II will conclude with a discussion of lower 
court cases that address group strip searches.16 
Then, Part III of this Comment will explain the three-step 
reasonableness test that lower courts utilize when addressing the 
constitutionality of group strip searches.17 Part III will also discuss the 
application of a “less invasive alternative” test to challenge the discretion 
of COs.18 Lastly, Part III will recommend that the Supreme Court formally 
adopt the “less invasive alternative” test to determine whether a group strip 
search is unreasonable.19 Finally, Part IV will offer concluding statements 
on the issues raised in this Comment.20 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that 
“[t]he peoples’ right to be secured in their persons . . . against 
unreasonable searches . . . shall not be violated.”21 Although the Fourth 
 
 10. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 483. 
 11. See generally Sumpter, 868 F.3d 473; Lewis, 870 F.3d 365; Stoudemire, 705 F.3d 
560. 
 12. See infra Section III.B.  
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Section II.A. 
 15. See infra Section II.B.1. “Lower courts,” as used throughout this Comment, 
includes both federal district courts and circuit courts. 
 16. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 17. See infra Section III.A. 
 18. See infra Section III.B.  
 19. See infra Section III.C.  
 20. See infra Part IV.  
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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Amendment protects all citizens,22 the Supreme Court established that 
prisoners’ Fourth Amendment protections might be limited.23 
One such limitation is in the context of strip searches.24 When 
confronted with cases premised on Fourth Amendment protections, 
courts25 are required to balance the nature of the strip search against the 
need for the strip search.26 When applying the reasonableness standard to 
claims that challenge a correctional institution’s policies or practices, 
courts generally afford deference27 in favor of COs’ penological expertise 
and interests.28 
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
Applying the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness standard,” the 
Supreme Court held in both Bell v. Wolfish29 and Florence v. Board of 
Chosen Freeholders30 that strip searches in correctional institutions are 
constitutional.31 The Supreme Court in Bell first discussed the 
constitutionality of strip searches in correctional institutions in 1979.32 The 
prisoners challenged the Bureau of Prisons’ policy33 that permitted COs to 
 
 22. See id.  
 23. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979). 
 24. See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012); Bell, 441 
U.S. 520; Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2017); Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. 
Safety & Corr., 870 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2017).   
 25. “Courts,” as used throughout this Comment, will include the U.S. Supreme Court, 
federal circuit courts, and federal district courts. 
 26. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 480. Courts do not universally apply a single dictionary 
definition of “strip search.” Florence, 566 U.S. at 323. In Florence, the Court noted that 
the term “strip search” is itself imprecise. Id. at 325. The Court explained that the term 
“strip search” can mean anything from having a prisoner remove clothing while a CO 
observes from a distance to instructing a prisoner to make various motions to dislodge 
anything that could be on the prisoner’s body. Id. On the extreme end, a strip search may 
include a body cavity search. Id. What the term “strip search” actually means depends on 
the context in which a court uses the term. Id. 
 27. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 547; see also infra Section II.B. 
 28. See, e.g., Florence, 566 U.S. at 323, 328; Bell, 441 U.S. at 546–48; Sumpter, 868 
F.3d at 480, 485; Lewis, 870 F.3d at 368; Williams v. City of Cleveland (Williams I), 771 
F.3d 945, 950 (6th Cir. 2014); Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 571–72 
(6th Cir. 2013); Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1137 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 29. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
 30. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012).  
 31. See id. at 339; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. 
 32. See generally Bell, 441 U.S. 520.   
 33. See Searches of Inmates, 28 C.F.R. § 552.11 (2018). The regulation states: 
Staff may conduct a visual search where there is a reasonable belief that 
contraband may be concealed on the person, or a good opportunity for 
concealment has occured [sic]. For example, placement in a special housing 
unit . . ., leaving the institution, or re-entry into an institution after contact with 
the public . . . is sufficient to justify a visual search. The visual search shall be 
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require prisoners “to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as 
part of a strip search conducted after every contact visit with a person from 
outside the correctional institution.”34 The Court held that the strip search 
policy, even without individualized probable cause, did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.35 
The Court reasoned that even though the record reflects only one 
occurrence where a strip search resulted in confiscating contraband, 
minimizing the security dangers to the correctional institution outweighed 
the intrusion of the prisoners’ privacy.36 Bell set the standard that strip 
searches are constitutional if three factors are deemed “reasonable”: (1) 
the manner in which the strip search is conducted, (2) the justification for 
initiating the strip search, and (3) the location of the strip search.37 
Then, about 30 years later, the Supreme Court decided whether the 
seriousness of the offense or an individualized reasonable suspicion were 
necessary considerations before conducting strip searches.38 In Florence, 
the police arrested the plaintiff because he had an outstanding arrest 
warrant for failing to appear at a hearing to enforce a fine.39 The plaintiff 
was admitted to one correctional institution and then shortly after that 
transferred to a second correctional institution.40 Upon being admitted to 
each of these correctional institutions, COs strip–searched the plaintiff.41 
The correctional institutions’ blanket strip search policies “applied 
regardless of the circumstances of the arrest, the suspected offense, or the 
[prisoner’s] behavior, demeanor, or criminal history.”42 
After being released from the second correctional institution, the 
plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking relief for violations of his Fourth 
 
made in a manner designed to assure as much privacy to the inmate as 
practicable.  
Id. § 552.11(c)(1). 
 34. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 558 (noting that the Metropolitan Correctional Center follows 
the Bureau of Prisons’ policy); see also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 578 n.1, 588–
89 (1984) (defining non-contact visits as having a clear glass panel separating prisoners 
from visitors, who visit over telephones, and having privacy partitions separating each 
individual privacy location; whereas contact visits would allow a limited degree of physical 
contact without the glass barrier).  
 35. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 560 (explaining that the Supreme Court declined to 
distinguish pre-trial prisoners from convicted prisoners).  
 36. See id. at 559 (noting that the lack of occurrences where strip searches resulted in 
confiscating contraband may even be a testament that the strip search technique is an 
effective deterrent).  
 37. See id.   
 38. See generally Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012).  
 39. See id. at 323. 
 40. See id. at 323–24. 
 41. See id. The correctional institutions’ policies were to strip search each prisoner 
upon being admitted to the correctional institution. Id. 
 42. See id. at 324.  
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Amendment rights.43 The plaintiff maintained that persons arrested for 
minor offenses should not be subjected to the same invasive strip searches, 
as part of the routine intake process, as other prisoners arrested for more 
serious crimes involving drugs and weapons.44 Alternatively, the plaintiff 
suggested that if COs have a particularized suspicion that a prisoner is 
concealing contraband, then that prisoner could be strip searched even if 
arrested for a minor offense.45 
The Court held that COs do not need to consider the seriousness of 
an offense when determining whether to strip search a prisoner; therefore, 
the correctional institution’s blanket strip search policy struck a reasonable 
balance between prisoner privacy and the needs of the correctional 
institution.46 The Court’s reasoning in Florence closely mirrored its 
reasoning in Bell in that in both cases, the Court focused on ensuring the 
correctional institutions’ security.47 Specifically, a new prisoner entering 
a correctional institution poses a risk to the correctional institution’s staff 
and general prisoner population if COs are not permitted to inspect the 
new prisoner’s body for hidden contraband.48 The Court reasoned that 
“[w]eapons, drugs, and alcohol all disrupt the safe operation of a 
[correctional institution].”49 
The Court explained that contraband successfully brought into the 
correctional institution creates leverage and power among the prisoners.50 
Leverage and power among the prisoners results in a substantial risk for 
everyone in the correctional institution.51 To dissipate such a risk, the 
Court agreed with the COs’ explanation that security is improved when all 
prisoners are required to undergo some type of strip search when entering 
the correctional institution.52 
Besides discovering hidden contraband, the Court explained other 
justifications for conducting a thorough strip search of prisoners as part of 
the intake process.53 For example, strip searches are necessary to help 
discover and treat any physical injuries and contagious conditions, such as 
 
 43. See id.   
 44. See id.  
 45. See id.  
 46. See id. at 339 (explaining that even though a blanket strip search policy is 
constitutional, strip searches conducted in an unreasonable manner may be deemed 
unconstitutional).  
 47. See id. at 328–29; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
 48. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 322. 
 49. See id. at 332.  
 50. See id. at 333 (explaining that leverage is created by placing value on such 
contraband resulting in the prisoners’ own “underground economy”).  
 51. See id. at 333–34 (explaining that the ultimate goal of COs is to minimize risk for 
both the prisoners and the staff in the correctional institution).  
 52. See id. at 328.  
 53. See id. at 330. 
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lice.54 Additionally, strip searches help identify gang members, allowing 
COs to then isolate gang members from one another, which promotes 
safety for everyone in the correctional institution.55 
Finally, the Court reasoned that if persons arrested on minor offenses 
are exempt from strip searches, prisoners may coerce people outside of the 
prison to commit minor offenses and smuggle contraband into the 
correctional institution without being subjected to a strip search upon 
intake.56 Furthermore, upon a prisoner’s arrival at the prison, COs would 
only have a few minutes to determine whether the prisoner’s offense was 
serious enough to authorize the strip search, which could give rise to 
charges of discriminatory application.57 The Court ultimately refused to 
accept such an offense-based standard because it would create an 
“unworkable standard” for the COs to apply and create unnecessary risk.58 
B. Aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Decisions as Applied to 
Group Strip Searches 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Bell and Florence, 
lower courts adopted the “reasonableness test” to apply to group strip 
searches.59 In applying the reasonableness test, lower courts must consider 
the scope of the particular intrusion, the justification for initiating the 
group strip search, and whether the need for the group strip search 
outweighed the privacy interests of the prisoners.60 
In determining the reasonableness of a strip search, the Supreme 
Court advised lower courts to give COs considerable deference when 
analyzing whether the manner in which the strip search was conducted 
advanced a legitimate penological interest.61 Courts give deference to COs 
because correctional institutions are often “crowded [and] unsanitary,”62 
 
 54. See id. at 330–31.  
 55. See id. at 331 (noting markings and tattoos representative of gang affiliations are 
often covered up by clothing).  
 56. See id. at 336. 
 57. See id. at 337 (explaining that if the CO’s conduct is later deemed discriminatory, 
then the CO may be held liable for conducting an improper strip search, and to avoid 
potential liability a CO may choose to forgo the strip search).  
 58. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 334, 338.  
 59. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 60. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 327; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).  
 61. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 323, 328; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 546–48; Sumpter v. 
Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 472, 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2017); Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 
870 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2017); Williams I, 771 F.3d 945, 950 (6th Cir. 2014); 
Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2013); Lopez v. 
Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1137 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 62. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 333.  
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and are “unique place[s] fraught with serious security dangers.”63 COs face 
new problems every day without having simple solutions available.64 
In Bell, the Court noted that courts should defer to the COs’ judgment 
unless substantial evidence is introduced to prove the alleged conduct was 
an exaggerated response.65 Although courts may not agree with a 
correctional institution’s policies and practices, the Supreme Court 
cautioned that COs are better informed than the courts,66 and courts should 
not question their judgment unless substantial evidence suggests 
otherwise.67 As long as the solution is reasonable and the means are linked 
to minimize risk and maximize security and internal order, courts give 
great deference to the COs’ judgment.68 
1. New Challenges Faced by Lower Courts 
Because the Supreme Court decided that strip searches are 
constitutional,69 post-Florence prisoners claim that the manner in which 
COs conduct strip searches is unreasonable, and therefore, violates their 
Fourth Amendment rights.70 The strip searches conducted in Bell and 
Florence involved one or two COs strip-searching one prisoner behind 
closed doors, where other prisoners or COs could not see the strip-
searched prisoner.71 
In the aftermath of Bell and Florence, prisoners have  challenged the 
constitutionality of non-private and group strip searches.72 Group strip 
searches involve strip-searching several prisoners simultaneously in an 
area where naked prisoners can view the strip searches of other naked 
prisoners without any privacy measures in place.73 Non-private means 
conducting the strip search in an area where other prisoners or COs not 
 
 63. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.  
 64. See id. at 547. “[T]he problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a 
correction[al institution] are not susceptible to easy solutions.” Id. Therefore, 
administrators at correctional institutions “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in 
the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to 
preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Id. 
 65. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 541 n.23; see also Florence, 566 U.S. at 328.   
 66. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 544.  
 67. See id.  
 68. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 323, 328; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 546–48; Sumpter v. 
Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 472, 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2017); Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 
870 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2017); Williams I, 771 F.3d 945, 950 (6th Cir. 2014); 
Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2013); Lopez v. 
Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1137 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 69. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 339; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. 
 70. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 71. See generally Florence, 566 U.S. 318; Bell, 441 U.S. 520. 
 72. See infra Section II.B.2.  
 73. See Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130–31 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
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part of the strip search can view the strip search.74 Group strip searches 
pose a challenge for lower courts when determining whether the 
penological interest justifies conducting strip searches in a group as 
opposed to privately.75 As of early 2019, the Supreme Court has not 
addressed the constitutionality of group strip searches. 
2. Prisoner Privacy versus Reasonable Penological Interest Test 
Applied by Lower Courts 
The issue lower courts address is not whether group strip searches, in 
general, are constitutional, but rather whether the need to conduct a group 
strip search in the particular case advanced a penological interest that 
outweighed the prisoners’ privacy interests.76 Depending on the court and 
the context, what is considered a reasonable penological interest varies and 
involves a fact-specific, case-by-case determination.77 
a. Lower Court Decisions Where the Group Strip Search was 
Reasonably Related to a Legitimate Penological Interest 
In Lewis v. Secretary of Public Safety & Corrections,78 the Fifth 
Circuit considered whether the District Court properly granted defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment.79 In Lewis, the Garment Factory’s80 
practice involved group strip-searching about 10 prisoners at a time.81 The 
group was collectively instructed to disrobe and perform various tasks 
 
 74. See Daphne Ha, Blanket Policies for Strip Searching Pretrial Detainees: An 
Interdisciplinary Argument for Reasonableness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2721, 2745–46 
(2011). “Group strip searches,” as used throughout this Comment includes both group and 
non-private strip searches.  
 75. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 326 (explaining that a correctional institution’s policy 
that limits a prisoner’s constitutional rights must be upheld “if it is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests”); see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 559; infra Section II.B.2.  
 76. See generally Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2017); Lewis v. 
Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 870 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2017); Williams I, 771 F.3d 945 (6th 
Cir. 2014); Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2013); Lopez, 609 
F. Supp. 2d 1125. 
 77. See generally Sumpter, 868 F.3d 473; Lewis, 870 F.3d 365; Williams I, 771 F.3d 
945; Stoudemire, 705 F.3d 560; Lopez, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125. 
 78. Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 870 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 79. See id. at 367; see also Summary Judgment, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 
2012) (defining “summary judgment” as a specialized motion where the moving party 
seeks judgment on the issue as a matter of law when the issues in the dispute can be decided 
without regard to any genuine dispute over a material fact).  
 80. See Lewis, 870 F.3d at 367 (explaining that prisoners worked at the Garment 
Factory which was owned and operated by the Louisiana Department of Corrections and 
was located next to a sally-port where supply trucks and civilian drivers enter; the prisoners 
at the Garment Factory made clothes and lines and had access to sewing tools and 
equipment).  
 81. See id. 
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necessary to search for any hidden contraband on the prisoners’ bodies.82 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s granting of the defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment and concluded that preventing the 
introduction of contraband into the correctional institution and 
maintaining security at the correctional institution are legitimate 
penological interests.83 
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that by conducting the group strip searches 
at the Garment Factory, the Garment Factory sought to prevent contraband 
from entering the main correctional institution from the prisoners and 
outside truck drivers that worked in the Garment Factory.84 The Fifth 
Circuit further reasoned that the group strip search policies were used to 
prevent prisoners from removing items capable of being used as weapons 
from the Garment Factory.85 
More recently, in Sumpter v. Wayne County,86 the Sixth Circuit 
considered whether the correctional institution’s periodic practice87 of 
conducting group strip searches constituted a clearly established Fourth 
Amendment violation.88 In Sumpter, most of the group strip searches at 
issue took place in the correctional institution’s registry89 and involved 
escorting the plaintiff and as many as five women prisoners to a room 
where they were all strip-searched at the same time.90 While being strip 
 
 82. See id.  
 83. See id. at 368; see also Lewis v. Chatterson, No. 1:10–CV–00291, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 174076, at *16 (W.D. La. Oct. 7, 2015) (concluding that “[t]he strip search and 
body cavity search policies . . . are reasonably related to well know, common-sense, 
legitimate penological objectives in prison security”). 
 84. See Lewis, 870 F.3d at 369. 
 85. See id. at 367–68 (relying on testimony of COs who participated in the group strip 
searches that stated they have “personally found marijuana, stolen clothes, cell phones and 
money during the strip searches. . .”); Lewis, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174076, at *16 
(concluding that “[u]nder the facts and circumstances of this case, the Garment Factory 
searches . . . appear to have been conducted in a reasonable and efficient manner designed 
to prevent the transportation by [prisoners] of tools, material for weapons, money, phones, 
and garments from the Garment Factory to the main are [sic] of the [correctional 
institution]”). 
 86. Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2017).  
 87. See id. at 483–84. “According to [the correctional institution’s] policy applicable 
during plaintiff’s detention, [COs] were to conduct strip searches ‘out of view of the public 
and other [prisoners]’’[w]hen possible’” and that “[g]roup [strip] searches were the 
exception.” Id.  
 88. See id. at 478.  
 89. See id. at 479 (explaining that the group strip searches at issue “occurred in the 
[correctional institution’s] [r]egistry, where [prisoners] are routinely searched when first 
arriving to the [correctional institution] or returning from a trip outside” and then escorted 
to see medical personnel or to be taken to their cellblock). 
 90. See id. at 479, 484 (noting that the group strip searches of up to five prisoners were 
only conducted when there was a line of twenty or more women waiting to be processed 
and the high volume of prisoners demanded it). 
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searched, the CO made several rude comments about the plaintiff’s body 
odor and hygiene.91 
The Sixth Circuit held that the group strip searches conducted in the 
correctional institution’s registry did not violate a clearly established 
Fourth Amendment right.92 The Sixth Circuit explained that addressing the 
constitutionality of group strip searches involves a three-step analysis: (1) 
determining the nature of the intrusion; (2) evaluating the need for the 
search; and (3) determining whether the strip search was reasonably 
related to legitimate penological interests.93 
First, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that strip searches, as a well-
established principle, are an extreme invasion of privacy.94 The court 
stated that strip searches conducted in front of an audience or in a 
discourteous manner enhanced the degree of the invasion of privacy.95 The 
registry group strip searches were a significant invasion of the plaintiff’s 
privacy because not only was the plaintiff’s naked body visually inspected, 
but her naked body was exposed to several other prisoners.96 Because the 
group strip searches were “especially” intrusive, step one was satisfied.97 
For step two, the Sixth Circuit addressed the penological justification 
for conducting the strip search in a group.98 The Sixth Circuit explained 
that because the CO conducted the group strip searches in a manner that 
was inconsistent with the correctional institution’s policies, the Sixth 
Circuit had to determine whether a legitimate penological interest for 
deviating from the policy existed.99 The Sixth Circuit relied on the CO’s 
judgment that group strip searches, as an expedited process, are necessary 
when a high volume of prisoners are awaiting admittance because delays 
impact the health of the prisoners and the safety of the correctional 
institution.100 The Sixth Circuit concluded that in this case, the need for an 
 
 91. See id. at 483 (noting that the CO told the plaintiff that she “smell[ed] like a funky 
monkey” and that she “needed to clean herself better”).  
 92. See id. at 478.  
 93. See id. at 482 (quoting Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 572 (6th 
Cir. 2013)) (explaining that the first step requires “examin[ing] the scope, manner, and 
location of the search,” the second step requires giving “due deference to the CO’s exercise 
of her discretionary functions,” and the third step requires “weighing the need [for the 
search] against the invasion”).   
 94. See id. at 483.  
 95. See id.  
 96. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 483 (citing Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 573) (explaining that 
even though the comments about the plaintiff’s body odor and hygiene points to the 
“dignity interests” that the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect “against unreasonable 
searches,” they “are not dispositive of reasonableness”). 
 97. See id. (noting that “an intrusive search is not necessarily an unreasonable one, 
especially in the corrections setting”).  
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. at 484.  
 100. See id. at 485.  
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expedited process was a legitimate penological justification for the CO to 
deviate from the policy.101 
The Sixth Circuit summarized the first two steps by stating that “on 
[the] one hand, the group strip searches . . . were especially intrusive[, but] 
on the other hand, [the] defendants . . . asserted a legitimate penological 
justification for [the] periodic[]” deviation.102 The Sixth Circuit explained 
that typically courts would then weigh the intrusion against the 
justification to determine whether the search was unreasonable.103 The 
Sixth Circuit, however, declined to do so because the defendants asserted 
qualified immunity,104 which did not require the court to complete the 
three-step analysis.105 
Because the Sixth Circuit recognized that no decision “squarely 
govern[ed]” the issue, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the COs had no 
reason to be aware that conducting group strip searches was unreasonable 
when the volume of prisoners needing processing would make individual 
searches imprudent.106 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District 
Court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the COs and the 
correctional institution.107 
b. Lower Court Decisions Where the Group Strip Search was Not 
Reasonably Related to a Legitimate Penological Interest 
In Sumpter and Lewis, the defendants identified a specific 
penological justification for the group strip searches, and the circuit courts 
either determined that the penological interest outweighed the prisoners’ 
privacy interests108 or granted qualified immunity to the defendant.109 In 
contrast to Sumpter and Lewis, other lower courts have addressed the issue 
 
 101. See id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. at 485–86 (explaining that qualified immunity protects the CO from 
personal liability unless the CO’s alleged conduct violated a clearly established 
constitutional right). 
 105. See id. 
 106. . See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 486–88 (noting that the Sixth Circuit rejected the 
plaintiff’s arguments that there was a right not to be subjected to group strip searches 
because the plaintiff’s authorities were not analogous to the case at issue, and the 
defendants in those cases failed to provide a legitimate penological interest to weigh against 
the particular intrusion); see also Crump v. Passaic Cty., 147 F. Supp. 3d 249, 258 (D.N.J. 
2015) (explaining that “[a]bsent controlling authority, a robust consensus of cases of 
persuasive authority is required to find that law in question is clearly established[],” and 
that “a single decision from another circuit is far from a robust consensus of cases”).  
 107. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 492.  
 108. See Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 870 F.3d 365, 367–69 (5th Cir. 2017).   
 109. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 485–88.  
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of group strip searches where the defendant did not assert a legitimate 
penological justification.110 
For example, in Lopez v. Youngblood,111 the correctional institution 
had a blanket policy that subjected prisoners to a group strip search 
anytime they returned from outside the correctional institution.112 During 
the searches, COs strip-searched groups of prisoners in view of each other 
and without any partitions or barriers.113 The plaintiffs asserted that the 
blanket policy of group strip-searching prisoners constituted a Fourth 
Amendment violation.114 
The District Court for the Eastern District of California rejected the 
defendants’ two main arguments: (1) that the group strip searches were not 
excessive or conducted in a harassing manner, and therefore, the severe 
personnel limitations and security concerns justified searches in small 
groups;115 and (2) that the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that only 
privately conducted strip searches are permissible.116 The District Court 
held that because the defendants offered no evidence that suggested 
alternative methods were not available or that the COs’ safety was a 
concern, the blanket group strip search policy violated the Fourth 
Amendment.117 
First, the District Court reasoned that unlike the authority cited by the 
defendants,118 in this case, the defendants did not take any additional steps 
 
 110. See, e.g., Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 574 (6th Cir. 2013); 
Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1138 (E.D. Cal. 2009).   
 111. Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (E.D. Cal. 2009).  
 112. See id. at 1130. The strip searches involved a “visual inspection of the 
underclothing, female breasts, buttocks, or genitalia of [the prisoner].” Id. The strip 
searches also included a visual body cavity search which included the “visual inspection 
of the anus and/or vaginal area . . . requiring the prisoners to position themselves in a way 
that would expose body cavity orifices.” Id.   
 113. See id. at 1130–31 (noting that other prisoners who were in view of the strip 
searches were also strip searched at the same time).  
 114. See id. at 1129.  
 115. See id. at 1134. The District Court rejected the defendants’ argument that limited 
space and staffing precluded the ability to conduct individual strip searches because 
administrative burden and inconvenience arguments typically do not justify a constitutional 
violation. Id. 
 116. See id. at 1135–37 (distinguishing Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 
1997), where “the court confronted a plan to detect contraband targeted to specific inmates, 
not a blanket policy permitting group strip searches,” and Michenfeider v. Sumner, 860 
F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988), where the group strip search policy was limited to the state’s most 
dangerous prisoners, which were housed in the maximum security unit, not a blanket group 
strip search policy and the court focused on CO safety and lack of available alternatives).  
 117. See id. at 1138.  
 118. See id. at 1134–35 (distinguishing Fernandez v. Rapone, 926 F. Supp. 255 (D. 
Mass. 1996), where the group strip searches were not unreasonable because a policy had 
been in place where the COs were to comply with a prisoner’s request to be searched alone, 
and Zunker v. Bertrand, 798 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Wis. 1992), where the group strip 
searches were constitutional because the COs and the correctional institution took 
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to protect the privacy of the prisoners that would have led the District 
Court to conclude that security concerns of the correctional institution 
outweighed privacy interests.119 Second, the District Court recognized 
situations where a group strip search is warranted to protect the safety of 
the COs, but in this case, the defendants did not present any evidence that 
the COs safety was a concern.120 
Lastly, the District Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs did not 
challenge the policy of strip-searching prisoners to discover contraband, 
but rather challenged a blanket policy of group strip-searching 
prisoners.121 The District Court concluded that the blanket policy was a 
Fourth Amendment violation because no evidence proved that group strip 
searches are more likely to result in finding contraband than individual 
strip searches.122 
Prior to Lopez, the Supreme Court had not addressed whether blanket 
policies for individual or group strip searches were constitutional. At the 
time Lopez was decided, the Supreme Court had only determined that 
reasonably conducted strip searches are not a violation of a prisoner’s 
Fourth Amendment.123 Three years after Lopez was decided, the Supreme 
Court in Florence held that blanket strip search policies are 
constitutional.124 Unlike Lopez, which concerned a blanket group strip 
search policy, Florence only applied to individual strip search polices, and 
the Court declined to carve out exceptions.125 Shortly after the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Florence, the Sixth Circuit decided at least two other 
cases, in addition to Sumpter,126 that addressed group strip searches.127 The 
first was Stoudemire v. Michigan Department of Corrections,128 where a 
CO subjected a prisoner, who was waiting for an escort so she could leave 
the infirmary’s common area, to a random strip search.129 The CO decided 
 
additional steps to protect the privacy of prisoners by using privacy curtains and obstructing 
the view of other prisoners waiting to be searched). 
 119. See id. at 1135–36. 
 120. See id. at 1137.  
 121. See Lopez, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1138. 
 122. See id. (explaining that individual strip searches would afford prisoners at least 
some privacy).  
 123. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979). 
 124. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 339 (2012) (explaining 
that even though a blanket strip search policy is constitutional, strip searches conducted in 
an unreasonable manner may be deemed unconstitutional). 
 125. See id. at 327-38. 
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 86-107. 
 127. See generally Williams III, 907 F.3d 924 (6th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied, 2018 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018); Williams I, 771 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2014); 
Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2013).  
 128. Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2013).  
 129. See id. at 567. 
 854 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 123:3 
to conduct the random strip search “because [she could]” and then escorted 
the prisoner to her cell to conduct the strip search.130 
The Sixth Circuit held the strip search unreasonable131 and applied 
the same three-step analysis introduced above in Sumpter.132 First, the 
Sixth Circuit recognized that strip searches are inherently invasive133 and 
because the CO did not block the window of the cell and the strip search 
did not take place in a private location, the degree of invasion was 
enhanced.134 
Second, the Sixth Circuit stated that the court must assume that the 
reason for initiating a strip search was to detect and deter contraband 
unless otherwise indicated by the evidence.135 The Sixth Circuit concluded 
that even though the CO may have had a valid reason for strip-searching 
the prisoner, the record did not demonstrate that exigent circumstances 
existed at the time to justify strip–searching the prisoner where others 
could see her naked.136 Because no legitimate penological justification for 
the strip search existed, the invasiveness of the strip search outweighed the 
non-existent penological justifications.137 
 
 130. See id. at 566–67 (noting that the prisoner’s cell had a window on the cell door 
that looked out onto a busy hallway, the CO did not cover the window even though people 
in the hallway could see the strip search being conducted, and the CO conducted the strip 
search with a smirk on her face). 
 131. See id. at 574.  
 132. See id. at 572 (explaining that first, the Sixth Circuit must determine the degree of 
the invasion, second, the Sixth Circuit needs to evaluate the need of the search, giving 
deference to the CO’s judgment, and finally, the Sixth Circuit must determine whether the 
need for the strip search was reasonably related to a legitimate penological justification); 
see also Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473, 482 (6th Cir. 2017).  
 133. See Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 572–73.  
 134. See id. (explaining that even though the CO did not explain her reasoning to the 
prisoner for conducting the strip search, and was smirking while conducting the search, 
these elements are not dispositive but add to whether the CO’s conduct made the strip 
search somewhat more invasive).  
 135. See id. at 573 (noting that the second step requires determining the need for the 
particular search at issue in the case).  
 136. See id. at 574 (explaining that additional justifications may include evidence that 
an emergency existed, such as a riot situation, evidence that supports that the location was 
chosen because other alternatives would have presented a risk to officer safety, evidence 
that the prisoner had a history of maladaptive behavior, and evidence of time or resources 
constraints); see also Crump v. Passaic Cty., 147 F. Supp. 3d 249, 257 (D.N.J. 2015) 
(explaining that there may also be situations where a group strip search may not be a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment). For example, where strip searches are conducted in 
front of a group because of a lockdown in the correctional institution, the need for safety 
and expediency in this type of emergency situation outweighed the consideration of the 
prisoner’s privacy. Id. However, this very specific circumstance does not imply that routine 
non-private strip searches are reasonable. Id. 
 137. See Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 574; see also Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473, 
482 (6th Cir. 2017). 
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The second case the Sixth Circuit heard was Williams v. City of 
Cleveland.138 Williams addressed whether forgoing the use of less invasive 
procedures and subjecting prisoners, as part of the correctional 
institution’s policy, to a group strip search upon being processed into the 
correctional institution is constitutional.139 The Sixth Circuit had to decide 
whether the plaintiffs’ complaint plausibly alleged that the group strip 
searches were unreasonable.140 The Sixth Circuit held that because 
alternatives were available, the group strip searches were unreasonable.141 
The Sixth Circuit’s analysis focused on whether the correctional 
institution possessed any readily available alternatives.142 The Sixth 
Circuit reasoned that where no reasonable alternatives to the manner in 
which the CO conducted the strip search are available, courts will likely 
conclude that the conduct was reasonably related to a legitimate 
penological interest.143 On the other hand, where obvious, easy alternatives 
that fully accommodate the needs of the correctional institution are 
available, any marginal benefits associated with a more invasive 
alternative are likely outweighed by the prisoner’s privacy interests, such 
that choosing the more invasive option would be unreasonable.144 The 
Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision and remanded for 
further proceedings.145 
On remand, the District Court had to determine whether exigent 
circumstances existed to necessitate strip-searching the prisoners in view 
of other prisoners.146 The correctional institution argued that 
administrative convenience justified the correctional institution’s blanket 
group strip search policy.147 The correctional institution explained that the 
policy was necessary because the correctional institution was “busy” and 
group strip searches would expedite the process.148 A CO stated, however, 
 
 138. Williams I, 771 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2014).  
 139. See id. at 947 (noting that the case also involved the process of COs spraying the 
prisoners’ naked genitals with a delousing solution from a pressurized metal canister).  
 140. See id.  
 141. See id. at 954. 
 142. See id.  
 143. See id. at 954–55.  
 144. See id.  
 145. See id. (explaining that because the Sixth Circuit heard the case on appeal at the 
motion to dismiss phase, the Sixth Circuit did not determine whether the group strip 
searches were unreasonable, rather only decided whether the complaint plausibly alleged 
that the defendants’ conduct was unreasonable). 
 146. See Williams v. City of Cleveland (Williams II), 210 F. Supp. 3d 897, 906 (N.D. 
Ohio 2016), rev’d and remanded, 907 F.3d 924 (6th Cir. 2018).  
 147. See id. at 907.  
 148. See id.  
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that individually strip-searching each prisoner could easily be done and 
would only slow the process “a little bit.”149 
Accordingly, the District Court held that the manner in which the CO 
conducted the group strip searches violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth 
Amendment rights.150 The District Court enjoined the defendants from 
conducting group strip searches and concluded that the defendants could 
perform strip searches individually or in groups with installed privacy 
partitions.151 The privacy partitions would allow the unclothed prisoners 
to be observed by the CO while obstructing the view of other unclothed 
prisoners also being searched.152 
After the District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs’, 
the defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit seeking reversal of the District 
Court’s decision.153 The Sixth Circuit first analyzed the issue as to whether 
the District Court’s grant of a permanent injunction was proper in relation 
to the named plaintiff’s standing to sue.154 Here, the plaintiff did not file 
the lawsuit until after leaving the correctional institution.155 As a result, the 
Sixth Circuit ultimately vacated the permanent injunctions because the 
plaintiff did not have standing to sue, meaning, she did not have a 
“‘personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ at the outset of 
litigation.”156 
In the first appeal, the Sixth Circuit decided whether the plaintiff’s 
second amended complaint set forth a plausible claim upon which relief 
could be granted.157 In the subsequent appeal, the Sixth Circuit had to 
decide, based on undisputed facts, whether the defendant executed a policy 
that violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.158 In this second 
 
 149. See id. at 907–08. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. at 908; see also Crump v. Passaic Cty., 147 F. Supp. 3d 249, 256 (citing 
Florence v. Bd. of Chose Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 330–33 (2012)) (explaining how even 
though Florence emphasized how visual strip searches can contribute to institutional 
security and sanitation, a non-private strip search does not contribute to security and 
sanitation any more than a private strip search does).  
 153. See Williams III, 907 F.3d 924, 928 (6th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied, 2018 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018). 
 154. See id. at 932–34. 
 155. See id. at 933. 
 156. Id. (quoting Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 922 (6th Cir. 
1988)). In cases involving prisoners, unless prisoners file a lawsuit before leaving the 
correctional institution, courts “assume the plaintiff would follow the law in the future and 
thus avoid exposure to potential searches.” Id. (citing Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 
473, 491 (6th Cir. 2017)). Here, even though Ms. Williams did in fact return to the 
correctional institution three times since filing the lawsuit at issue in this case, “the relevant 
inquiry is whether she had a live, actionable claim for relief at the time she filed suit.” Id.  
 157. See id. at 935. 
 158. See id.  
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appeal, the plaintiff had to demonstrate that the correctional institution 
acted unreasonably in conducting the group strip searches.159 
The Sixth Circuit noted that while the correctional institution had a 
“long-time policy of conducting group strip searches during the intake 
process . . . groups of two or three [prisoners] were only strip searched 
together in circumstances when large numbers of [prisoners] were waiting 
to be processed.”160 The Sixth Circuit, relying on their decision in Sumpter, 
concluded that even though individual strip searches were possible, the 
need for the search was one of expediency to avoid significant delays.161 
Being expedient and avoiding significant delays promotes safety and 
addressing health problems as quickly as possible.162 Ultimately, because 
the plaintiff did “not provid[e] evidence questioning the legitimacy of the 
[defendant’s] proffered justification[,]” the Sixth Circuit reversed the 
District Court’s decision and remanded with instructions to grant summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants.163 
After Bell, Florence, and several of the lower courts decisions, the 
only articulable “rule” is that group strip searches should not be a part of 
everyday practice or permitted under a blanket policy. But even that 
articulation is not wholly accurate. After reading the lower court decisions, 
a blanket group strip search policy is arguably constitutional with the 
installation of privacy curtains or similar privacy measures.164 On the other 
hand, group strip searches are arguably only reasonable in limited 
circumstances or as a rarely used exception to individual strip searches.165 
Without a uniform rule to help courts and correctional institutions 
determine whether a particular group strip search is reasonable, prisoners 
will continue to be deprived of their dignity and fundamental right of 
privacy. To ensure that prisoners are being treated equally across all 
jurisdictions, courts should apply the “less invasive alternative test” to 
determine if a group strip search was “reasonable.”166 
 
 159. See id. at 934-35. 
 160. Id. at 936.  
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. at 932, 936.  
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 108–22; see also supra notes 118–20, 136 and 
accompanying text.   
 165. Riot situations, emergencies, and other exigent circumstances would justify the 
need to conduct group strip searches rather than taking less invasive measures. See Sumpter 
v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473, 498 (6th Cir. 2017) (Clay, J., dissenting); Stoudemire v. 
Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 573-74 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 166. See infra Section III.C. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
In Florence, the Supreme Court upheld a correctional institution’s 
blanket strip search policy that subjected all prisoners to strip searches 
after returning from outside the correctional institution or from contact 
visits.167 The correctional institution argued that a blanket strip search 
policy was necessary to ensure the security and safety of all persons inside 
the correctional institution.168 Even though the blanket strip search policy 
in Florence was ultimately deemed constitutional, the Supreme Court 
cautioned that strip searches conducted in an unreasonable manner might 
be unconstitutional, and that such a determination requires a fact-specific 
analysis.169 
A. Three-Step Reasonableness Analysis that Lower Courts 
Utilize to Address the Constitutionality of Group Strip 
Searches in Correctional Institutions 
In addressing group strip searches, lower courts perform a three-step 
analysis: (1) determining the nature of the intrusion; (2) evaluating the 
need for the search; and (3) determining whether the strip search was 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.170 The first step 
requires that courts examine the scope of the privacy invasion, the manner 
in which the search was conducted, and the location of the search.171 When 
analyzing the second step, and evaluating the need for the search, courts 
give deference to the CO’s discretion, based on the specific 
circumstances.172 The third step requires that courts weigh the need for the 
group strip search against the prisoners’ privacy interests to determine 
whether the group strip search was related to a legitimate penological 
interest.173 
When lower courts have addressed group strip searches, the focus of 
the analysis has been on the third step.174 When analyzing the first step, 
courts start with the basic presumption that a strip search, even a private 
strip search, is inherently an invasion of privacy.175 Several lower courts 
 
 167. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 322, 339 (2012). 
 168. See id. at 333–34. 
 169. See id. at 329–30, 339; see also Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 483 n.3. 
 170. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 482; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979); 
Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 572 (6th Cir. 2013).  
 171. See, e.g., Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 482; Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 572. 
 172. See, e.g., Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 482; Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 572. 
 173. See, e.g., Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 482; Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 572. 
 174. See, e.g., Williams III, 907 F.3d 924, 935–36 (6th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied, 2018 
U.S. App. LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018); Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 571–74; Lopez 
v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1134–39 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 175. See, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. at 559–60; Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 572–73.  
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have agreed that a group strip search is an enhanced invasion of privacy 
as compared to a private strip search.176 After relying on these general 
principles, courts move on to the next step, which is evaluating the need 
for the particular group strip search.177 
Concerning strip searches generally, discovering contraband to 
maintain safety and security at a correctional institution has been 
considered a legitimate justification for conducting strip searches.178 In 
some situations, if COs do not provide a justification, courts will assume 
that discovering contraband was the reason unless proven otherwise.179 
But the need to discover contraband cannot be a one-size-fits-all 
justification. 
Lower courts spend the majority of their analysis trying to determine 
whether the need to conduct the group strip search was reasonably related 
to a legitimate penological interest.180 In other words, lower courts must 
decide if the need to conduct the group strip search outweighs the 
prisoner’s right to privacy.181 
B. The Scale is Tipped in the Correctional Institution’s Favor 
Even Before the Prisoner Files a Lawsuit 
Step three of the analysis requires courts to weigh the prisoners’ 
privacy interests against the needs of the correctional institution.182 When 
evaluating the need for the strip search, courts have admitted that 
deference is given to COs because the courts are not experts on what is 
necessary to maintain safety and security in a correctional institution, even 
if courts do not agree with the method.183 Several courts agree that 
maintaining safety and security at a correctional institution is a top 
priority.184 
 
 176. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 483; Williams I, 771 F.3d 945, 953 (6th Cir. 2014); 
Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 574; Crump v. Passaic Cty., 147 F. Supp. 3d 249, 256 (D.N.J. 
2015). 
 177. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559; Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 573. 
 178. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 326 (2012).  
 179. See Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 573; see also Lopez, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1137. 
 180. See, e.g., Williams III, 907 F.3d 924, 935–36 (6th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied, 2018 
U.S. App. LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018); Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 571–74; Lopez, 
609 F. Supp. 2d at 1134–39 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 181. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 327.  
 182. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 483. 
 183. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 326; see also Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 480–81; Stoudemire, 
705 F.3d at 571–72; Young v. Cty. of Cook, 616 F. Supp. 2d 834, 847 (N.D. Ill. 2009).   
 184. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 333–34; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 
(1979); Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 481; Lewis, 870 F.3d at 369; Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 573. 
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1. Courts Give Correctional Officers Too Much Deference 
In the brief history of cases that have dealt with group strip searches, 
the prisoners usually prevailed where the CO did not provide a penological 
justification or, at least, did not provide a reasonable justification.185 If no 
penological justification is provided, one court suggested that the court 
should assume that a strip search was conducted to find contraband unless 
evidence indicates otherwise.186 Because the courts rely so heavily on the 
COs’ discretion, prisoners have the additional burden of disproving the 
presumption that the strip search was conducted to find contraband.187 
Prisoners must disprove the presumption, even when no penological 
justification is provided.188 
COs cannot provide vague, generic explanations as to why 
conducting a group strip search was necessary.189 One court suggested that 
the need to conduct a group strip search must be “unusually dire” before 
that need can outweigh the privacy interests of the prisoners.190 Prisoners 
might have a valid constitutional claim if the justification, or lack thereof, 
for the group strip search does not validate the CO’s actions.191 Courts 
should not merely rely on the CO’s opinion without first hearing the full 
extent of the circumstances surrounding the group strip search.192 Then, 
after being fully informed, courts should decide whether the prisoner is 
raising a valid constitutional claim.193 
COs might have a valid penological interest in conducting strip 
searches in general, but COs must have an additional justification to 
conduct group strip searches without taking extra steps to ensure some 
 
 185. See Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 574; see also Lopez, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1138. 
 186. See Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 573; see also Lopez, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1137. 
 187. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 484; see also Lewis, 870 F.3d at 369. 
 188. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 484; see also Lewis, 870 F.3d at 369. 
 189. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 497 (Clay, J., dissenting) (noting that a “blanket 
explanation that whenever the county jail has to process a lot of female [prisoners], they 
can be publicly strip searched in groups, cannot be justified”). 
 190. See Williams I, 771 F.3d 945, 954 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Florence, 566 U.S. at 
327). 
 191. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 495 (Clay, J., dissenting) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 
U.S. 78, 84 (1987)) (“[T]he Supreme Court has instructed that ‘federal courts must take 
cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison[ers].’”); see also Williams III, 907 
F.3d 924, 936 (6th Cir. 2018) (reversing the District Court’s decision to grant the plaintiff 
summary judgment because the plaintiff did not “provid[e] evidence questioning the 
legitimacy of the [defendant’s] proffered justification”), reh’g denied, 2018 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018).  
 192. See Young v. Cty. of Cook, 616 F. Supp. 2d 834, 847 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 193. See id. (explaining that even though deference is given to the COs’ expertise, 
“[COs] are still obliged to present evidence in support of their blanket strip search policy”). 
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privacy.194 Some other justifications that have generally been accepted by 
the lower courts involve riot situations, emergencies, and exigent 
circumstances that would justify the need to conduct group strip searches 
rather than taking less invasive measures.195 
Courts give deference to the COs’ judgments, but courts should also 
scrutinize such judgments. Scrutinizing the COs’ judgments would ensure 
that the penological justifications were the justifications at the time the 
search was conducted and not the justifications fabricated as a result of a 
prisoner filing a lawsuit.196 Prisoners do not necessarily retain all rights 
while incarcerated, but prisoners are still human beings, and their dignity 
should be protected.197 
If COs cannot prove that conducting group strip searches contributed 
to the purpose for the strip search any more than a private strip search 
would have, then the COs likely acted with a lack of regard for the 
prisoners’ privacy rights.198 Unless either courts or prisoners challenge 
deference, courts are likely to find that the penological interest justified 
the need to conduct the group strip searches, even if that results in the 
violation of the prisoners’ Fourth Amendment rights.199 
2. How Prisoners Can Rebut Such Deference 
When courts give COs such deference, prisoners are already working 
from behind before even filing a lawsuit. Not only do prisoners have to 
prove the CO’s conduct violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment 
right, but prisoners must also prove the group strip search was not 
conducted to find contraband.200 As discussed below, presenting evidence 
that challenges the justification for the group strip search,201 or presenting 
 
 194. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 482; see also Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 
F.3d 560, 573–74 (6th Cir. 2013); Williams II, 210 F. Supp. 3d 897, 906 (N.D. Ohio 2016), 
rev’d and remanded, 907 F.3d 924 (6th Cir. 2018).  
 195. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 498 (Clay, J., dissenting); see also Stoudemire, 705 F.3d 
at 573–74.  
 196. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 492 (Clay, J., dissenting); see also Williams I, 771 F.3d 
945, 951–52 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a CO’s statement that there was a legitimate 
penological justification for conducting the strip search “does not conclude the [court’s] 
inquiry”).   
 197. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 495, 497 (Clay, J., dissenting) (stating that COs “must 
be held to a certain standard of human decency and civility” and the group strip searches 
at issue “were carried out according to the subjective and arbitrary whims of the [CO]”); 
Williams I, 771 F.3d at 953 (quoting Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 
2005)).  
 198. See Crump v. Passaic Cty., 147 F. Supp. 3d 249, 256 (D.N.J. 2015). 
 199. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 484; see also Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 870 
F.3d 365, 369 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 200. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 481; see also Crump, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 256. But see 
Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1138 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 201. See infra Section III.B.2.a. 
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evidence that a less invasive alternative to the group strip search was 
available, may be sufficient for prisoners to prove the group strip search 
was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.202 
a. Challenge the Penological Justification 
Group strip searches may be necessary in some situations to maintain 
safety and security at the correctional institution.203 On the flip side, 
however, general assertions of limited space and resources have not been 
upheld as adequate penological justifications.204 To challenge COs’ 
discretion, prisoners must provide substantial evidence that proves that the 
CO’s decision to group strip search the prisoners was an exaggerated 
response to the circumstances that prompted the need for a strip search.205 
Because courts rely on the CO’s deference, however, courts will not doubt 
the CO’s discretion absent a valid reason to do so.206 
If prisoners can provide evidence that a group strip search was 
calculated harassment or conducted with evil intent, the prisoners may 
have a better chance of rebutting the penological justifications.207 
Alternatively, prisoners can challenge the penological justification by 
offering evidence that proves that a less invasive alternative was available 
other than conducting a group strip search.208 
b. Less Invasive Alternatives Test 
The Supreme Court expressly rejected the “least restrictive 
alternative” test;209 however, what the Supreme Court did deem a factor to 
consider is whether at the time of the group strip search there was a less 
invasive alternative.210 The correctional institution is not required to 
employ the least invasive alternative, but rather, when less invasive 
 
 202. See infra Section III.B.2.b.   
 203. See supra Section III.B.2.  
 204. See Lopez, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1136–37. 
 205. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 481; Crump, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 256; but see Lopez, 609 
F. Supp. 2d at 1138. 
 206. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 484; see also Lewis v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 870 
F.3d 365, 369 (5th Cir. 2017); Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1261 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 207. See Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 571 (6th Cir. 2013); see 
also Lopez, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1134.  
 208. See Farmer, 288 F.3d at 1258. 
 209. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90–91 (1987) (explaining that “[COs] do not 
have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of 
accommodating the [prisoner’s] constitutional complaint” however, the existence of 
alternatives may be evidence that the correctional institution’s policy is an exaggerated 
response to the problem). 
 210. See id.; see also Williams I, 771 F.3d 945, 954–55 (6th Cir. 2014); Farmer, 288 
F.3d at 1260-61; Crump, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 256.  
 2019 DEAR PRISONERS—BE PREPARED TO BE GAWKED AT 863 
alternatives could have been utilized to obtain the same objective as the 
group strip search at little or no cost to the correctional institution, the need 
to conduct a group strip search is likely to be deemed unreasonable.211 
Proof of less invasive alternatives that would adequately accommodate the 
needs of the correctional institution strengthens the prisoners’ position. 
Not only does such evidence prove that the penological interest did not 
necessitate conducting a group strip search, but such evidence also proves 
the group strip search was an exaggerated response.212 
For example, in Sumpter, the majority concluded that because the 
prisoner did not refute the penological justifications, the majority accepted 
the penological justifications as valid.213 On the contrary, the dissent 
suggested that to address the CO’s health and safety concerns, instead of 
conducting group strip searches, the prisoners with medical cards could 
have been searched one at a time before processing the prisoners without 
medical cards.214 Therefore, the CO’s timing problem would be solved, 
and thus, the strip searches could have been less invasive and embarrassing 
for the prisoners.215 
In addition, unless circumstances such as a riot, emergency, or some 
other exigency arise, the most obvious alternative is to conduct individual 
strip searches.216 One alternative may be the installation and utilization of 
privacy curtains or partitions.217 Correctional institutions could adopt a 
 
 211. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 497 (Clay, J., dissenting); see also Williams III, 907 F.3d 
924, 938 (6th Cir. 2018) (White, J., dissenting in part) (stating that the plaintiff “established 
through substantial evidence that there are obvious, easy alternatives to [defendant’s] 
policy of strip-searching [prisoners] in the presence of other female [prisoners]”), reh’g 
denied, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018).   
 212. See Williams II, 210 F. Supp. 3d 897, 908 (N.D. Ohio 2016), rev’d and remanded, 
907 F.3d 924 (6th Cir. 2018); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. “Evidence of the regulation’s 
impropriety exists when ‘there are ready alternatives available to the regulations in 
question that fully accommodate the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid 
penological interests,’ that go untapped.” Williams III, 907 F.3d at 938 (White, J., 
dissenting in part) (citing Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 404 (6th Cir. 1999)).  
 213. See Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 484.  
 214. See id. at 497 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
 215. See id.   
 216. See Williams I, 771 F.3d 945, 955 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Williams II, 210 F. 
Supp. 3d at 907 (noting that a lieutenant “admitted that, while it may ‘slow things down 
just a little bit,’ the detainees could easily be strip searched individually versus as part of a 
group”). 
 217. See Williams II, 210 F. Supp. 3d at 908; see also Young v. Cty. of Cook, 616 F. 
Supp. 2d 834, 840 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (noting that the defendants’ expert was unaware of any 
other jails that have conducted group strip searches without privacy dividers in the last 
twenty years); Williams III, 907 F.3d 924, 938-39 (6th Cir. 2018) (White, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that in response to several lawsuits on the issue of group strip searches the Ohio 
Corrections Officer Basic Training Manual states that the “search area should provide 
privacy from outside observation[:] 1. [m]odesty panels are inexpensive and effective[; 
and] 2. [u]se of these panels demonstrates good faith of a department to conduct searches 
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policy that requires COs to adhere to any requests by prisoners to be 
privately strip–searched rather than subject to a group strip search.218 One 
court even suggested that prohibiting contact visits would be a less 
invasive alternative.219 When these alternatives are available, but not 
utilized, lower courts should be hesitant to decide that the penological 
interest justified the need to conduct a group strip search.220 
C. Recommendation 
Prisoners face a particular challenge when alleging that group strip 
searches are unconstitutional because little case law on the issue exists.221 
The rule derived from Florence is that strip searches are constitutional if 
they are reasonably conducted and a legitimate penological justification 
outweighs the prisoner’s right to privacy.222 In Florence, the Supreme 
Court declined to carve out potential exceptions to the rule223 and did not 
consider the rule’s application to group strip searches.224 Furthermore, the 
Court instructed lower courts to give deference to the discretion of the COs 
when determining whether a strip search is reasonably related to a 
legitimate penological interest.225 
Such deference has tipped the scale in favor of COs even before 
prisoners file lawsuits.226 The Supreme Court is in the best position to 
ensure that prisoners and correctional institutions’ interests are balanced 
on an even scale. The Supreme Court should formally adopt the use of the 
less invasive alternative test when determining whether the need to 
conduct a group strip search was reasonably related to a legitimate 
penological interest.227 Requiring courts to use the less invasive alternative 
test analysis will ensure COs’ justifications were, at the time of the search, 
legitimate, rather than self-serving, and protect the already limited rights 
that prisoners retain while incarcerated. 
 
in a constitutional manner”), reh’g denied, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 
2018). 
 218. See Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1135 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing 
Fernandez v. Rapone, 926 F. Supp. 255 (D. Mass. 1996)).  
 219. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 n.40 (1979). 
 220. See Williams I, 771 F.3d at 950, 954; see also Crump v. Passaic Cty., 147 F. Supp. 
3d 249, 256 (D.N.J. 2015). 
 221. See Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 568 (6th Cir. 2013); see 
also Crump, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 258.  
 222. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 339 (2012); see also 
Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 571. 
 223. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 338; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 559; Williams I, 771 F.3d 
at 951; Crump, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 258. 
 224. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 338–39.  
 225. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 547. 
 226. See infra Section III.B. 
 227. See infra Section III.B.2.b. 
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The cases that discuss group strip searches imply that blanket group 
strip search policies that are part of the daily practices of the correctional 
institution are likely unconstitutional.228 But where is the line drawn 
between a group strip search being reasonably related to a legitimate 
penological interest and violating the prisoners’ right to privacy? Group 
strip searches in situations like emergencies, riots, and lockdowns are 
unavoidable,229 and thus, a clear safety issue exists. 
How far can the correctional institutions go beyond group strip-
searching two to three prisoners when the intake area gets “busy” or a 
group of 10 prisoners before leaving a garment factory? The prisoner, or 
former prisoner, with limited resources is required to challenge the 
judgments of the COs which courts give practically unchecked deference, 
but the correctional institution is not required to explain why the 
installation of modesty panels could not be accomplished.230 Determining 
where the line should be drawn concerning the number of prisoners that 
can be strip-searched at once is likely too fact-specific to establish a bright 
line rule. Alternatively, however, requiring consideration or 
implementation of less invasive alternatives—modesty panels, policies 
where prisoners may request a private search, policies where prisoners 
with medical cards are searched first—before conducting a group strip 
search is likely an easier standard to apply. 
A declaration by the Supreme Court, requiring the use of the less 
invasive alternative test, would help guide the lower courts’ analysis of the 
third step: balancing the need to conduct a group strip search against the 
correctional institution’s penological interests. Because alternatives that 
afford prisoners some privacy are available and would meet the same goal 
as conducting the group strip search at little to no cost, group strip 
searches, absent exigent circumstances, should be held as unreasonable 
and unconstitutional.231 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Lower courts have applied the three-step analysis established by the 
Supreme Court when determining the reasonableness of group strip 
searches.232 The three-step analysis requires: (1) determining the nature of 
the intrusion; (2) evaluating the need for the search; and (3) determining 
 
 228. See Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (E.D. Cal. 2009); see also infra 
Section II.B.2. 
 229. See Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 57273 (6th Cir. 2013); see 
also Crump v. Passaic Cty., 147 F. Supp. 3d 249, 257 (D.N.J. 2015). 
 230. See Williams III, 907 F.3d 924, 939 (6th Cir. 2018) (White, J., dissenting), reh’g 
denied, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 34594 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018). 
 231. See Williams I, 771 F.3d 945, 954–55 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 232. See supra Section II.B. 
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whether the strip search was reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests.233 When conducting the analysis, most courts have concluded 
that with respect to group strip searches, steps one and two are well-
established and are non-issues.234 
Correctional institutions are “unique place[s] fraught with serious 
security dangers.”235 To combat these risks and dangers, the COs face 
situations that do not have simple solutions.236 Because the courts are not 
experts on the situations COs face in correctional institutions, courts rely 
on the COs’ instincts and discretion when evaluating the need for the 
search.237 Courts, however, should not blindly rely on the COs’ discretion. 
Prisoners need to challenge and provide evidence that undermines the 
COs’ discretion.238 The Supreme Court should formally adopt the use of 
the “less invasive alternative” test to analyze whether the need to conduct 
a group strip search was reasonably related to a legitimate penological 
interest.239 In most situations, if less invasive alternatives are available, 
courts should deem the group strip search unconstitutional.240 
Even though the Supreme Court in Florence concluded that blanket 
strip search policies are constitutional, the Court also emphasized that the 
manner in which the search is conducted could render the search 
unconstitutional.241 Protection of prisoners’ dignity is the responsibility of 
the COs, and the deference afforded to the COs should reflect this 
responsibility when deciding whether the group strip search was 
reasonably justified.242 Prisoners have limited rights, but that does not 
mean they forfeited all of their freedoms.243 
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